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Abstract— Traditional authentication in radio-frequency (RF) 
systems enable secure data communication within a network 
through techniques such as digital signatures and hash-based 
message authentication codes (HMAC), which suffer from key-
recovery attacks. State-of-the-art IoT networks such as Nest also 
use Open Authentication (OAuth 2.0) protocols that are 
vulnerable to cross-site-recovery forgery (CSRF), which shows 
that these techniques may not prevent an adversary from copying 
or modeling the secret IDs or encryption keys using invasive, side 
channel, learning or software attacks.  Physical unclonable 
functions (PUF), on the other hand, can exploit manufacturing 
process variations to uniquely identify silicon chips which makes 
a PUF-based system extremely robust and secure at low cost, as it 
is practically impossible to replicate the same silicon 
characteristics across dies. Taking inspiration from human 
communication, which utilizes inherent variations in the voice 
signatures to identify a certain speaker,  we present RF- PUF: a 
deep neural network-based framework that allows real-time 
authentication of wireless nodes, using the effects of inherent 
process variation on RF properties of the wireless transmitters 
(Tx), detected through in-situ machine learning at the receiver 
(Rx) end. The proposed method utilizes the already-existing 
asymmetric RF communication framework and does not require 
any additional circuitry for PUF generation or feature extraction. 
The burden of device identification is completely shifted to the 
gateway Rx, similar to the operation of a human listener’s brain. 
Simulation results involving the process variations in a standard 
65 nm technology node, and features such as LO offset and I-Q 
imbalance detected with a neural network having 50 neurons in 
the hidden layer indicate that the framework can distinguish up to 
4800 transmitters with an accuracy of 99.9% (ൎ	99% for 10,000 
transmitters) under varying channel conditions, and without the 
need for traditional preambles. The proposed scheme can be used 
as a stand-alone security feature, or as a part of traditional multi-
factor authentication. 
Keywords—Radio Frequency, Authentication, PUF, Machine 
Learning, Deep Neural Network, Internet-of-Things (IoT), 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Security, Device Signatures 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and Motivation 
The advancements in sensor electronics, wearable 
technology and mobile computing/communication platforms 
have resulted in an unprecedented data deluge in the domain of 
Internet-of-Things (IoT). According to CISCO’s Visual 
Networking Index (VNI) based Global Mobile Data Traffic 
Forecast, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication systems 
are expected to have about 27.1 billion connected devices by 
2021 [1]. Due to their inherent mobile nature, these devices 
perennially operate under untrusted environmental conditions 
and are exposed to a number of potentially malicious attacks. 
The development of mobile hardware security has been 
comparatively slower than the improvements in computation 
power [2]. When these devices are required to be securely 
authenticated using a symmetric-key implementation, a secret 
key is usually placed in a non-volatile memory (NVM) or a 
battery-backed SRAM and is subsequently used in a digital 
signature or hash-based encryption. However, these techniques 
are vulnerable to key-hacking (through invasive/semi-
invasive/software/side channel attacks) and come with 
significant area and power overhead for the NVM/SRAM 
implementation. The widely used OAuth 2.0 protocol [3] for 
current IoT devices suffer from cross-site-recovery-forgery 
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Fig. 1. (a) Authentication in Human Voice Communication: Bob (the 
receiver) can identify Alice (the transmitter) based on the unique voice 
signatures, and not based on the contents of what Alice speaks. Mallory (the 
impersonator) can also be identified (as not Alice), since his unique voice 
signatures would be different from Alice. (b) Analogous System that utilizes 
the proposed RF-PUF framework for secure radio communication.
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(CSRF) attacks, and may eventually become cumbersome as the 
number of devices per user grows (OAuth requires the user to 
manually authenticate every device in the network). Because of 
these reasons, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) have 
emerged as a promising alternative/augmentation which exploit 
manufacturing process variations to generate a unique and 
device-specific identity for a physical system [4]-[7]. PUF 
implementations are simpler than memory-based solutions as 
they consume significantly less energy and chip area than 
expensive cryptographic hardware such as secure hash 
algorithm (SHA) or public/private key encryption with 
NVM/SRAM that may also require anti-tamper mechanisms to 
detect invasive attacks.  
PUFs are usually classified into strong and weak PUFs 
depending on the number of challenge-response pairs (CRP) that 
they can handle. Weak PUFs support a small number of CRPs 
which are linearly related to the number of components used to 
build the PUF. Strong PUFs, on the other hand, support a large 
number of CRPs such that polynomial time attacks become 
infeasible. These type of PUFs are usually employed in device 
authentication applications [2]. 
IoT systems can significantly benefit from a PUF-based 
authentication protocol, wherein the physical characteristics of 
each transmitter in the wireless sensor network can be analyzed 
and stored in a secure server as a general technique, thereby 
augmenting or replacing traditional key-based authentication 
schemes. In modern Digital Communication, ideal digitally 
modulated data pass through device-dependent unique 
analog/RF impairments (for example, frequency error/offset and 
I-Q imbalance) in the transmitter chain, which are compensated 
for at the receiver. These process-dependent non-idealities are 
already present in the wireless communication signal path, and 
are traditionally discarded/minimized as unwanted non-
idealities. In RF-PUF, we embrace those existing non-idealities 
through an in-situ light-weight machine learning engine at the 
receiver side, that extracts the ‘entropy’ and creates a ‘strong 
PUF’ to securely identify the transmitters. This is similar to the 
inherent authentication in human voice communication as 
shown in Fig. 1(a). Bob (the receiver) can identify Alice (the 
transmitter) based on the unique voice signatures, and not based 
on the contents of what Alice says. Mallory (the impersonator) 
can also be identified as his unique voice signatures would be 
different from Alice. The source of entropy is in the vocal 
signatures of speaker (no extra hardware for entropy extraction), 
whereas the decoding of the entropy is in the listener’s brain 
(heavy lifting at the receiver). Fig. 1(b) shows the analogous 
system (RF-PUF), wherein the unique signatures in each 
transmitter are used for device identification in the brain of the 
receiver, represented by the machine learning hardware. The 
entire system is envisioned in Fig. 2 in presence of channel 
impairments, with each of the transmitters inherently working as 
a PUF instance [8]. Such an implementation not only helps in 
authentication of physical nodes in resource-constrained IoT 
environment, but also enables applications such as intrusion 
detection, forensic data collection, defect detection/monitoring 
and body-connected biosensors as shown in [9]-[12]. 
B. Our Contribution 
We have previously demonstrated the methods of process-
detection in wireless radios [13]-[15] and the effect of variations 
in analog/mixed-signal/RF properties of such radios to adapt it 
for zero-margin operations [16]-[18]. In this paper, we build on 
that expertise to identify radio instances based on their inherent 
signatures automatically imparted on communicated signal, 
leading to a detailed analysis of the PUF properties of radios for 
enhanced physical layer security. The major contributions of 
this work are as follows: 
1) A conceptual development of RF-PUF is presented for an 
asymmetric IoT network, which consists multiple low-cost, low-
power, distributed transmitters, and a single central hub as a 
receiver. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
work in this area for low-cost, preamble-less, intrinsic PUF-
based authentication of IoT nodes. This is in contrast to 
traditional RF fingerprinting methods which are usually 
preamble-based and/or software defined as discussed in the next 
section. 
2) Enabling RF-PUF operation without any extra-hardware 
at the resource-constrained IoT node. As described in Section 
III, RF-PUF does not require any additional on-chip/off-chip 
circuitry for PUF implementation at the Tx. The proposed 
scheme makes use of inherent variations resulting from factors 
such as process variability (on-chip) and component tolerance 
(on-board) for each transmitter. A method to compensate for 
non-ideal Rx signatures is also proposed in Section V. 
3) Conforming to our earlier work on on-hub analytics where 
we proposed a method of staged inference using conditional 
deep learning [12], a light-weight machine learning framework 
is developed in the current work, which compensates for 
receiver non-idealities, and accounts for both data variability 
and channel variability at the same time. Since this is a non-
linear multidimensional classification problem, an Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) is employed as a learning engine. 
Simulation results with ൎ 10000 transmitters demonstrate ൎ
	 99% accuracy using supervised learning which proves the 
practical feasibility of RF-PUF for IoT-based applications 
targeted towards small to medium-scale smart systems with 
about a thousand devices connected to a single gateway receiver. 
In essence, the proposed method lends the biggest benefits 
in asymmetric smart networks as 1) no extra hardware is 
required at the resource-constrained IoT nodes, while the 
heavy-lifting is performed by the gateway receiver, which is 
similar to a listener’s brain, 2) the method can be employed as 
 
Fig. 2. Visualization of RF-PUF at a system level [8] 
a stand-alone physical-layer security feature, or for multi-factor 
authentication, in conjunction with network-layer, transport-
layer and application-layer security features. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II lists the most recent developments in the area of PUF and RF 
authentication, along with their applications in the relevant 
domains. Section III presents the architecture of the proposed 
PUF in detail, while Section IV illustrates the performance 
metrics of the proposed method. The simulation results, along 
with the security aspects are analyzed in detail in Section V. 
Finally, Section VI summarizes this paper and points to the 
future directions. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The notion of Silicon PUFs was introduced by Gassend et al. 
in [19], where the authors illustrated the use of PUF in anti-
counterfeiting applications by measuring the intrinsic delays in 
a self-oscillating circuit. However, the additional requirement of 
robustness in a large sample pool led to the inclusion of various 
error-correction mechanisms at the system-level [20]-[23]. The 
error correction improves the system reliability at the cost of 
additional software/hardware burden on the PUF 
implementation. As shown in [2], many of these techniques tend 
to leak the secret keys that are used to generate the syndrome 
bits. In such a scenario, a higher number of PUF bits are 
generated first, and then are down-mixed to increase entropy. 
RF fingerprinting has been a popular method to 
automatically identify the wireless nodes in a network by using 
the time and frequency-domain properties extracted during 
transmitter power-on [24]-[27]. While the transient properties 
are consistent, they offer acceptable classification accuracy only 
when the beginning and the end of the transient can be reliably 
identified [10]. Moreover, the analysis of transient properties 
require very high oversampling rates (500 MS/s in [25] and 50 
GS/s in [26]) which pose significant power and precision 
requirements that lead to expensive receiver architectures. An 
alternative and less adopted approach involves the use of steady-
state properties of the transmitters, which are extracted after the 
communication loop transients are settled. However, the steady-
state signal is data-dependent in different transmissions (with 
different bit-streams) which makes it unsuitable for 
identification purpose. For this reason, previously reported 
literature [9]-[10] use fixed random channel access (RACH) 
preambles along with techniques such as spectral averaging or 
matched filtering to correctly identify the transmitters. The 
steady-state analysis method is relatively unexplored, but is 
promising as it does not require sophisticated and power-hungry 
receiver architectures. More importantly, the steady-state 
portion of the signal can easily be identified as opposed to the 
transient states during power-on. 
In this study, we combine the concept of PUF with RF 
fingerprinting to develop a system architecture that utilizes RF 
properties of the transmitters to identify nodes using an in-situ 
machine learning framework at the receiver. A preamble-less 
steady state approach is adopted which is implemented by 
training the learning sub-system with multiple data streams and 
with different channel conditions. Although the proposed 
approach utilizes manufacturing variabilities in the transmitters 
for device identification (similar to state-of-the-art RF 
fingerprinting [28]-[31]), RF-PUF is unique from RF 
fingerprinting in 4 different aspects: (1) the operation for RF-
PUF is not preamble-based, (2) unlike transient mode RF 
fingerprinting, RF-PUF does not require high oversampling 
ratio at the receiver, (3) RF-PUF utilizes significantly higher 
dimensionalities in the feature space than steady-state RF 
fingerprinting that gives rise to its strong PUF properties 
(Section III C.(f)) while providing justification for the 
nomenclature, (4)  RF-PUF compensates for the non-ideal 
receiver signatures (Section V. A), thus allowing a large number 
of devices/challenge-response-pairs. Machine learning had been 
used in prior work [29]-[30] for device identification, but the 
proposed work also identifies machine learning as a solution to 
the practical challenge of receiver signature compensation that 
often limits larger system implementations. As compared to 
previous implementations such as the RF-DNA [32], RF-PUF 
does not require any additional analog/RF hardware for PUF 
implementation at the Tx as the features are selected such that 
feature generation and extraction is ingrained in the transceiver 
operation (RF-DNA involved measuring the reflected/refracted 
EM waves based on the 3D-positioning of scattering antennas 
which are different for each RF unit). Moreover, error-
correction and noise cancellation measures are also intrinsic to 
the transceiver architecture, which increases the reliability of the 
proposed RF-PUF without the need for any specific error 
correction mechanism dedicated for the PUF operation. 
III. PROPOSED PUF 
This work primarily focuses on a technique of authenticating 
devices within a low-cost swarm of IoT nodes, which can have 
significant variation from node to node. If all the components 
are tightly controlled during fabrication and manufacturing, the 
standard deviation of variation will be less and the number of 
unique devices which are correctly identified will reduce. 
Interestingly, that will increase the cost of fabrication 
significantly and hence it is cheaper and easier to embrace the 
non-idealities (up to a point where it does not affect the overall 
performance) which justifies the use of RF-PUF. 
A. Features utilized in RF-PUF implementation 
As described below, the PUF properties of the system 
originate from the manufacturing variability of the Tx(s). The 
identification of each node is performed in the Rx sub-system 
which extracts multiple features from the received signals. 
 
Fig. 3. DC, Amplitude and Phase imbalance in 16-QAM
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(a) Frequency features: Every transmitter has its unique 
frequency offset with respect to the ideal carrier frequency 
because of inherent variations in the local oscillator (LO). This 
offset has been used as a prime feature for device identification 
in [10] and [33]. The allowable limits for the frequency offsets 
can be different for different established standards. For example, 
the frequency error must be within േ25 ppm of the center 
frequency for the IEEE 802.11b standard for WiFi (and within 
േ40 ppm for IEEE 802.15.4 which is one of the preferred 
standard for IoT). This corresponds to a normal distribution with 
standard deviation (ߪ) of 20.1 kHz on either side of the 2.412 
GHz center frequency for 802.11b. With a high-quality 
reference clock (low jitter with zero mean) in the Rx, frequency 
offsets for multiple Tx(s) in the system can be calculated. In our 
implementation, a carrier synchronizer module (which already 
exists in a standard receiver for LO offset compensation) is 
employed in the receiver that finds the frequency offset and 
compensates for it. The ppm value of the offset is provided to a 
3-layer machine-learning framework for identifying the device. 
(b) I-Q features: The amplitude and phase mismatch 
between the in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) components of the 
transmitted signal is unique for different transmitters. Fig. 3 
shows the nature of these imbalances and how they can impact 
the constellation diagram at the receiver for a 16-QAM 
(quadrature amplitude modulated) signal. Other transmitter 
variabilities such as power-amplifier (PA) back-off and gain 
variations also affect the constellation. Compressive 
nonlinearity affects the outer symbols in the constellation more 
than the inner symbols. Hence it is necessary to extract 
amplitude and phase information for all symbols in the 
constellation. These features, along with the frequency errors 
from each transmitter has the potential to uniquely identify each 
transmitter in the network. 
(c) Channel features for compensation: The communication 
channel introduces time and frequency dependent variations in 
various forms such as attenuation, distortion and Doppler shift. 
To establish reliable operation of the RF-PUF, these channel 
properties need to be estimated and compensated. For this 
purpose, an automatic gain control (AGC) block, a Root-Raised 
Cosine (RRC) filter and a Doppler corrector is employed as 
indicated in Fig. 4. The RRC filter, along with the AGC module, 
helps reducing inter-symbol interference (ISI) and provides a 
measure of the channel attenuation to an ANN. Similarly, the 
Doppler corrector module estimates and corrects the amount of 
Doppler shift due to any physical movement of the transmitters 
and receivers in the network, and provides the information to the 
ANN for channel compensation. 
B. Communication System Example in RF-PUF: 16-QAM 
Fig. 4 shows the entire transceiver system for RF-PUF 
authentication. The 16-QAM transmitter does not have any 
additional circuitry for PUF implementation. The receiver, on 
the other hand, has multiple stages for RF signal processing and 
simultaneously performs feature extraction at various stages. A 
simple 3-layer neural network takes the extracted features as 
inputs and identifies the transmitters based on training data. 
C. Properties of the RF-PUF 
The proposed system has the necessary and sufficient 
properties of a PUF [5] that makes it suitable for 
security/authentication applications: 
(a) Constructability: A PUF class ℙ  is constructible if a 
random PUF instance (݌௥ ∈ ℙ) can be created by invoking a 
particular creation procedure, ℙ. Create:  ݌௥ ← ℙ. Create 
 
Fig. 4. System-level simulation setup involving Transmitter and Receiver for RF-PUF implementation 
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RF-PUF aims to exploit the technical limitations that exist in 
the physical process of fabricating the RF transmitters. Hence, 
the manufacturing process itself serves as the creation procedure 
ℙ. Create for each of the PUF instances (RF transmitters). 
 (b) Evaluability: A constructible PUF class ℙ is evaluable if 
for a random PUF instance (݌௥ ∈ ℙ) and a random challenge (ݔ), 
it is possible to evaluate a response ݕ: ݕ ← ℙ. Evalሾ݌௥ሺݔሻሿ 
For RF-PUF, ݔ  is the challenge input bit-stream to the 
transmitter, and ݕ is the unique analog response for each PUF 
instance. The uniqueness in the response can be attributed to 
multiple features, due to the die-to-die and within-die variations. 
(c) Reproducibility: A PUF class ℙ is reproducible/reliable 
if it is evaluable and if the probability of intra-PUF variation 
being lower than a system-defined small number is very high. 
For the RF-PUF, the measure of reproducibility can be 
defined as the difference ( D୧୬୲୰ୟ ) between two distinct 
evaluations (ݕሺݔሻ, ݕ′ሺݔሻ) of a particular PUF on the challenge	ݔ. 
D୧୬୲୰ୟሺݔሻ ≅ 	݀݅ݏݐሾݕଵሺݔሻ, ݕଵ′ሺݔሻሿ 
D୧୬୲୰ୟ is the intra-chip (intra-PUF) distance that serves as a 
metric to measure the resilience of the RF-PUF to varying 
environmental conditions. Reproducibility/reliability is also a 
measure of stability as D୧୬୲୰ୟ ൌ 0% in an ideal scenario. 
(d) Uniqueness: A PUF class ℙ is unique if it is evaluable 
and if the probability of inter-PUF variation being higher than a 
system-defined large number is very high. 
For the RF-PUF, the measure of uniqueness can be defined 
as the difference of the responses between two PUF instances 
ሺݕଵሺݔሻ, ݕଶሺݔሻሻ evaluated with the same challenge ݔ. 
D୧୬୲ୣ୰ሺݔሻ ≅ 	݀݅ݏݐሾݕଵሺݔሻ, ݕଶሺݔሻሿ 
 (e) Identifiability: A PUF class ℙ is easily identifiable if it 
is reproducible as well as unique, and if the probability of intra-
PUF variation being lower than inter-PUF variation is very high. 
ProbሺD୧୬୲୰ୟ ൏ D୧୬୲ୣ୰ሻ ൎ 1 
As will be seen in Section IV, RF-PUF simultaneously 
exhibits reproducibility, uniqueness and identifiability. In the 
simulation results shown in Section IV, the worst case D୧୬୲ୣ୰ 
(3.9 ppm : geometric mean of ppm variations over all features) 
was found to be larger than the corresponding  D୧୬୲୰ୟ (2.9 ppm : 
geometric mean of ppm variations over all features) for 1000 
transmitters. These properties coupled with the physical 
unclonability and unpredictability of the silicon manufacturing 
process makes the RF-PUF implementation practically feasible. 
(f) PUF Strength:  The challenge for RF-PUF is a digital data 
sequence, while the response contains the analog features 
embedded in actually transmitted RF signal (and hence in the 
received signal) which is unique for each Tx. Since the 
challenge-response-pairs (CRPs) consist features which are real-
valued analog numbers, the total number of CRPs for ݉ distinct 
analog/RF features will be Թ௠ where Թ represents all values in 
the real number space within a range of ±3σ around the 
mean. When each of these features is quantized using a 16 bit 
ADC, for example, Թ௠   translates to  2ଵ଺௠  which is a large 
number even for small values of ݉  (3-10). Hence, if a 
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary knows the 
responses from ݇  transmitters, it is possible to predict the 
response for the ሺ݇ ൅ 1ሻ-th transmitter only with a negligible 
probability of ቀ ଵଶభల೘	ቁ. This property makes RF-PUF a ‘strong 
PUF’ which is suitable for authentication applications [2]. 
D. Training the ANN for Device Identification  
The 3-layer ANN is trained in multiple iterations with 
different pseudo-random bit-streams (PRBS) to account for data 
variability in evaluation stage and to enable preamble-less 
operation. The hyper-parameters, including the number of 
training iterations (shown in Fig. 6(c), that represent sampling 
and collection of data streams under dynamic channel 
conditions which vary slowly during a single evaluation period 
but can change significantly from one evaluation to another), 
were optimized aggressively through scaled conjugate gradient 
backpropagation algorithm, using variable number of epochs 
and a target training-set-error. For the data presented in 
subsequent sections, the number of training iterations was set to 
10, with a stream length of 30,000 bits. The training dataset was 
presented to the ANN as a ݊ ൈ݉ feature matrix as shown in 
Fig. 5. The extracted channel conditions for the 10 iterations 
were also presented as features so that the network learns to 
compensate for the channel variations. The number of neurons 
in the hidden layer was varied and was optimized for 
performance (detection accuracy). During Evaluation phase, a 
different pseudo-random data-stream from any of the ݊ 
transmitters is provided to the ANN in presence of a different 
channel condition. This mode of training helps the neural 
network to learn both data variabilities and channel variabilities, 
thereby leading to a robust system. 
 
Fig. 5. Preamble-less Training for the ANN. This method enables on-the-fly 
authentication without knowing the expected bit-stream from the Tx [8]. 
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The proposed PUF is simulated using the Neural Network 
toolbox in MATLAB, with a 16-QAM modulation scheme. The 
manufacturing process variations of a standard 65 nm 
technology is included during the simulations to model the 
statistical variability in the range of ሺߤ േ 3ߪ). A total of 10,000 
PUF devices were simulated under varying channel conditions. 
Table I shows the mean and standard deviation of the transmitter 
features and channel features that are used during simulations. 
The LO frequency and frequency error follows the IEEE 
802.11b standard. I-Q imbalance has a mean value of 0, while 
the linearity of the power amplifier (PA) is defined by the back-
off value (w.r.t. 1 dB compression point). ܧ௕/ ଴ܰ is the ratio of 
energy per bit and noise which defines the signal to noise ratio 
(SNR) at the receiver. 
A. Probability of False Detection  
Fig. 6(a) shows the probability of false detection of a Tx as 
a function of the total number of transmitters (n_Tx) in the 
network, which indicates that the error is < 10-3 up to 4800 
transmitters, and < 10-2 for 10,000 transmitters. Fig. 6(b) 
illustrates the probability of false detection of a transmitter as a 
function of the number of neurons in the hidden layer of the 
ANN (n_Hidden_Layer).  It is to be noted from both Fig. 6(a) 
and Fig. 6(b) that the probability of an error in detection does 
not reduce much when the n_Hidden_Layer is more than 50. 
Increasing the size of the neural network beyond this limit will 
cause overfitting and will increase the power and area cost 
without significant performance benefit. 
Fig. 6 (c) shows the effect of training in multiple iterations 
with variable data as compared to training with a fixed data-
stream (preamble). In case of preamble-based training, the ANN 
is trained using only the fixed headers in the data-stream. In our 
implementation, conversely, the ANN is trained using variable 
data-stream in multiple iterations. As the number of training 
iterations increase, the performance of the system tends towards 
the performance achieved in fixed-preamble case. This overhead 
of additional training iterations are also useful in terms of 
learning the channel conditions and variabilities, as each 
iteration has a different channel condition which the network 
learns to compensate. 
Fig. 6. (a) Probability of False detection as a function of the total number of Tx in the system. (b) Probability of False detection as a function of the number of 
neurons in the hidden layer of 3-layer ANN. (c) Reduction in prediction error with increased number of training iterations. Each iteration trains the network with 
a different bit-stream and different channel conditions. (d) Probability of False detection as a function of the standard deviation (ߪ) of the ܧ௕/ ௢ܰ in the channel in 
presence of additive white gaussian noise (AWGN). (e) PUF instances with 1000 Tx (50 instances for each Tx, with different channel conditions) and 50 neurons 
in hidden layer  w.r.t. geometric mean of normalized ppm variation of features. (f) Worst case reliability (D୧୬୲୰ୟ) and uniqueness (D୧୬୲ୣ୰) for the 1000 transmitters. 
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TABLE I 
TRANSMITTER AND CHANNEL FEATURES USED FOR SIMULATION [34][35] 
Feature Average (μ) Standard Deviation (σ) 
LO Frequency 2.412 GHz 20.1  kHz (8.3 ppm) 
I-Q Amplitude Imbalance  0 dB 1 dB 
I-Q Phase Imbalance  0o 5o 
PA back-off (linearity) 30 dB 1 dB 
ܧ௕/ ଴ܰ 15 dB 2 dB 
Doppler Shift 0 Hz 1 Hz 
B. Robustness to Noise, Dynamic Channel Variation and ISI 
Even for short-range (< 30 m) communication, the channel 
is affected by noise/attenuation in the communication medium, 
interference, Doppler shift and fading, out of which the 
contribution of attenuation is the most dominant [36]. Fig. 6(d) 
illustrates the effect of channel attenuation on the probability of 
false detection. Without the RRC filter, inter-symbol 
interference (ISI) increases which leads to an error probability 
of ൎ 0.02 in device identification when the standard deviation 
of channel ܧ௕/ ଴ܰ  is 10 dB (with mean ܧ௕/ ଴ܰ ൌ  15 dB). In 
presence of the RRC filter at the Rx, it is easier to extract 
features from the I-Q data for different transmitters, because of 
a reduction in ISI. As a result, probability of error reduces to as 
low as 10-5 for the range of variations shown in Fig. 6(d). 
C. Intra-PUF Hamming Distance (Reliability) and Inter-PUF 
Hamming Distance (Uniqueness) 
Fig. 6(e)-(f) illustrates the Reliability and Uniqueness of RF-
PUF w.r.t. the input features. It is to be noted that unlike a 
traditional PUF circuit that produces digital output, RF-PUF 
embeds the unique signature of the transmitter in the RF 
properties of the message signal, and hence the Intra-PUF and 
Inter-PUF distances are plotted using the normalized parts-per-
million (ppm) variation of the features. To represent the ppm 
variations of multiple features on a single axis, a transformation 
of the feature spaces is required. Since the total number of 
possible PUF instances is proportional to ∏ ௜ܰ௠௜ୀଵ 	(݉	= number 
of features, ௜ܰ 	= number of possible values for feature ݅), it is 
intuitive to utilize the geometric mean of the ppm values of all 
the features for representing a PUF instance. 
The worst case inter-PUF variation with 1000 transmitters is 
found from the simulations and is shown Fig. 6(f). The worst-
case inter-PUF difference thus defined is very close to the intra-
PUF difference which explains the high (in the range of 10-3 or 
higher) probability of false detection when number of 
transmitters are more than a few thousand (Fig. 6(a)). 
D. Randomness and Bias 
For the guessing entropy to be low, the randomness of the 
PUF needs to be high, whereas the bias needs to be low. For the 
simulations shown in this paper, the NIST recommended 
random bits [37]-[38] are used to generate the features within a 
range of ሺߤ േ 3ߪ), as shown in Table I. The resulting pass rates 
for the RF-PUF output (normalized geometric mean of feature 
values) is shown in Fig. 7, alongside the pass rates for NIST 
recommended random bits (NIST RND). Evidently, the pass 
rates for the PUF output are higher than 0.9 for each of the 15 
tests, which matches closely with the NIST RND. Any bias in 
the PUF output is refuted by the Frequency test, which exhibits 
a pass rate > 0.95. 
E. Experimental Validation of RF-PUF: Physical 
Implementation with SDRs 
To prove the feasibility of RF-PUF in hardware, an 
experimental setup (as shown in Fig. 8) is developed using 
software-defined-radios (SDR). The SDRs are ideally 
programmed to operate at 2.4 GHz, with zero I-Q imbalance. 
However, there will be both frequency error and I-Q non-
idealities in the practical scenario. The frequency error is 
captured using a spectrum analyzer, while the I-Q imbalance 
can be captured by configuring one of the SDRs as a receiver, 
using the GNU Radio platform. Fig. 8 shows 2 SDRs, with a 23 
kHz difference in their carrier frequencies. This difference in 
frequency can be detected at the receiver side from the down-
converted I-Q data, by sensing the baseband signal over a 
duration which is inversely proportional to the difference in 
frequency. To generate enough number of unique classes that 
help validating the learning engine, multiple unique 
transmitters are artificially emulated from these SDRs by 
modifying the ambient temperature in a closed environment. 
Changing the temperature in discrete steps of 5Ԩ in the range 
of 0Ԩ -25Ԩ  modifies the Tx properties, and the receiver 
considers every 5Ԩ change in the temperature as a different 
transmitter when it does not have any information about the 
temperature. The non-ideality information from the 2 SDRs, 
along with data from 8 other emulated transmitters are provided 
as input to the neural network framework (Section III.D), which 
detects all 10 transmitters correctly. This confirms that the 
neural network can identify multiple transmitters with a small 
difference in their RF features. In a more realistic scenario, the 
features from the transmitters need to be automatically 
calibrated/compensated at the receiver w.r.t. different 
 
Fig. 7. Results of randomness test for RF-PUF using NIST Test Suite [38] 
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Fig. 8. Experimental Setup to extract physical transmitter properties. Two 
software-defined-radios (SDR) @ 2.4 GHz are shown in this setup, exhibiting 
a frequency difference of 23 kHz as non-ideality. The amplitude and phase 
imbalance is captured in the GNU Radio software after reception. 
temperature and supply voltages before the classification using 
the ANN. For that, the system would require a temperature and 
supply sensing mechanism, and additional pre-processing at the 
on-board application processor. Alternatively, the temperature 
and voltage information can be directly provided to the neural 
network so that it learns to compensate for the variations, which 
would be included as a future work. 
V. DISCUSSION ON RX SIGNATURES, ATTACK MODELS, 
SECURITY AND ROBUSTNESS 
A. Compensating Rx Signatures 
It is evident from Fig. 6(a) that the machine learning 
framework can support up to 10,000 transmitters with a 
probability of false detection < 10-2 and up to 4800 transmitters 
with a probability of false detection < 10-3. Fig. 6(b) indicates 
that the required number of neurons in the hidden layer should 
be within 50-100 to successfully detect the transmitters, which 
can be implemented on a processor in case of a software-
defined-radio environment. While this is promising in terms of 
the conceptual feasibility, the receiver non-idealities will pose 
significant implementation constraints on the system.  
For the initial system simulation, an ideal receiver has been 
assumed which does not insert any signature of its own into the 
feature set extracted from the transmitters. However, in a 
practical scenario, the receiver will alter the signatures in the 
received signal. This can be taken care of using a loopback 
analysis to find the receiver properties [39], post which the 
system can be incrementally trained for such receiver non-
idealities. Alternatively, the receiver sub-system can be 
corrected pre-emptively for non-idealities (values of which are 
obtained through the loopback test) using a second set of LO 
offset compensator (carrier synchronizer), AGC and I-Q 
compensator modules as shown in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 9 shows the training-based method for compensating the 
receiver signatures. A second neural network learns the 
functions to be employed on individual features to compensate 
the non-idealities, and then performs the linear transformations 
on each of those features. The compensated feature vector is 
then provided to the original ANN that performs the device 
identification. Fig. 10 illustrates the effect of this compensation 
method. When the number of transmitters is more than 25, the 
probability of false detection increases from 10-7 in the ideal 
receiver case to 10-2 in the practical receiver case without 
compensation. With compensation, this value again reduces to 
10-6. When the number of transmitters is > 8000, the error is 
about 10-2 in the case with receiver compensation, which is 
sufficient for most smart-home applications. 
B. Possible Attack Models 
In [40], the possible attack mechanisms on a strong PUF are 
classified into two primary categories: (1) the PUF re-use model 
and (2) the malicious PUF model. In most practical applications, 
the attack usually comprises of a combination of the two models. 
The PUF re-use model is based on the scenario that an adversary 
can have repeated temporary physical access to the PUF when 
the PUF is communicating with an authenticating medium. This 
presents the adversary an opportunity to model and replay the 
responses. On the other hand, the malicious PUF model assumes 
that either the PUF responses can be simulated using a software 
algorithm, or the adversary can have direct access to all the 
CRPs through a built-in logger program/implanted Trojan. Since 
RF-PUF does not store any digitally encoded signature, it does 
not suffer from the malicious PUF model. However, it can 
potentially suffer from PUF re-use models, as described in the 
next part of the discussion.  
 
Fig. 9. One possible method that accounts for receiver non-idealities while 
performing device identification. A neural network performs the receiver 
signature compensation before device identification. 
 
Fig. 10. Probability of False detection as a function of the total number of 
transmitters in the system, with and without receiver signature compensation. 
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Fig. 11. One possible Replay Attack model: Adversary needs to perform its 
own receiver signature compensation (-ARS*) and transmitter signature 
compensation (-ATS*). The necessary conditions to successfully replay the 
message from Alice with the original transmitter signature (TxS) are 
ARS=ARS* and ATS=ATS*.
(a) Replay attack model: 
Replay attacks are theoretically possible in the proposed RF-
PUF based authentication system, as a wireless transmitter 
can send identical digital data-streams repeatedly (in other 
words, PUF re-use cannot be avoided). This scenario is 
presented in Fig. 11. Alice, the Tx wants to send a message, 
“Hi, I’m Alice” to the gateway receiver. This message 
inherently contains the Tx signature (TxS). We assume that 
the adversary (Ad) intercepts the transmitted data and in the 
process, adds the attacker’s receiver signature (ARS) to the 
signal. Subsequently, Ad compensates for the ARS using –
ARS*, which require high-speed and high resolution circuits 
that can negate minuscule changes in voltage and time. To 
successfully mimic Alice’s signatures, Ad needs to 
compensate for its own Tx signatures (ATS) as well. This 
also utilizes high speed and high resolution circuits and 
compensates ATS using –ATS*. If ARS=ARS* and 
ATS=ATS*, the adversary can mimic Alice by sending the 
same message and same signatures. However, implementing 
both ATS and ARS compensation would require expensive 
ADCs and DACs for achieving negligible residual errors. 
One may argue that the machine-learning-based gateway 
receiver compensation shown in Section V A. could also 
need similar high-resolution ADCs. However, imperfect 
compensations in the gateway receiver results in a small 
residual error, which only introduces a constant shift in the 
detection threshold for all the transmitters. On the other 
hand, for the attacker model, both ARS and ATS 
compensations have to be accurate. Otherwise, the replay 
attack is imperfect as the replayed signal does not mimic 
Alice’s signature, and hence the adversary may not be 
successful in impersonating Alice. This limitation makes the 
replay attack extremely costly in the RF-PUF scenario. 
(b) Machine Learning (ML)-based modeling attacks: 
The proposed system can also suffer from a machine-
learning attack as an external attacker can model the 
responses (using a separate learning engine) from RF-PUF 
through repeated access to the transmitted data.  
However, it must be noted that the proposed system utilizes 
a supervised learning algorithm to uniquely identify the PUF 
devices. For an external attacker, mimicking a particular 
transmitter will translate to an unsupervised learning 
(clustering) problem, and hence the modeling accuracy will 
directly depend on the ratio of the number of CRPs accessed 
by the attacker to the total number of CRPs [41]. The 
modeling time, on the other hand, will depend on the number 
of CRPs that the adversary has access to. Hence, there exists 
a trade-off between the modeling time and accuracy, which 
is described with an example in the next section. 
C. Countermeasures against PUF re-use Attacks 
In [42], the authors implemented a strict one-time-usability 
protocol to avoid PUF re-use and modeling attacks. However, 
for our application, one-time-use is not feasible, as the 
transmitters (i.e. the PUF instances) need to send data whenever 
they are required to. As shown in [40], an alternative way to 
thwart such attacks is to simultaneously incorporate two 
additional properties during PUF implementation: (1) erasability 
and (2) certifiability. Erasability requires that the single 
responses from the PUF would be made impossible to read back 
without affecting other responses. This facilitates tamper-
detection, but requires logical reconfigurability and additional 
control circuitry to be implemented on-chip. Certifiability, on 
the other hand, signifies that a PUF response must be checked 
offline (without any external “Trusted Authority”) for 
possibilities of tampering, or any change in the PUF properties. 
This also requires additional circuitry in each PUF instance. A 
detailed analysis of the additional circuitry required for 
erasability and certifiability is out of scope of this work. 
In the absence of additional circuits for erasability and 
certifiability, RF-PUF can suffer from external ML attacks. In 
this section, we perform an estimate of the training time for an 
ML attack in order to demonstrate its practical limits for a 
problem with high dimensionality. As shown in Section III C.(f), 
the number of CRPs for the RF-PUF is 2ଵ଺௠  where ݉ is the 
number of features considered. For a nominal value of ݉=5, the 
the number of CRPs become 2଼଴ ൎ 10ଶସ . [43] shows that a 
machine-learning based attack model on  10଺ CRPs takes 267 
days to get completed on an INTEL Quadcore Q9300 processor. 
10ଶସ  CRPs will result in significantly higher training time, 
leading to a wait time of several years before completing the 
attack. 
D.  Security and Robustness 
In Fig. 12, RF-PUF is compared with various other PUFs in 
state-of-the-art literature [44]. Two well-known metrics – false 
acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) are used to 
define the security and robustness, respectively, for the PUFs. A 
low value for both FAR and FRR ensures that the authentication 
is both secure and robust. However, there is a trade-off between 
these two quantities which can be controlled by the detection 
threshold of PUF inferencing mechanism (the machine learning 
framework for RF-PUF). If the inferencing is done by a 
threshold which is much higher than the inter-PUF distance, 
FAR increases while FRR reduces, which means better 
robustness. On the other hand, if the decision is made using a 
 
Fig. 12. Comparison of RF-PUF with various other PUFs available in 
literature. The values for False acceptance rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate 
(FRR) for other PUFS are taken from [44]. 
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threshold which is significantly lower than the inter-PUF 
distance, FAR reduces while FRR increases, leading to higher 
security. By varying the detection threshold, different levels of 
FAR and FRR can be achieved. 
With a small number of transmitters (ൎ 50), the FAR and 
FRR for RF-PUF along the equal error line is very close to the 
pairwise-compared (P.C.) Ring Oscillator PUF [45], and is 
much better than the other PUFs in Fig. 12. As the number of 
transmitters increase, the overall error rate increases as the inter-
PUF distances reduce. However, depending on the application 
scenario, the detection threshold within the machine learning 
framework can be altered, leading to either highly secured or 
highly robust systems. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a conceptual development of RF-PUF is 
presented along with a feasibility study showing that the 
inherent RF properties arising from the manufacturing process 
in a wireless node can be exploited as a strong PUF for device 
authentication in asymmetric IoT networks without any 
additional hardware at the transmitters. Using an in-situ machine 
learning based framework, up to 10,000 transmitters can be 
detected with about 99% accuracy. The proposed method also 
eliminates the need for preamble-based or key-based 
identification of modern IoT nodes and enables low-cost secure 
authentication using the intrinsic properties embedded in the RF 
signal that does not have any extra hardware cost at the 
transmitter. Consequently, the proposed scheme does not 
consume any additional power at the transmitter side. The 
receiver, however, requires two neural networks which can be 
implemented using the on-board microprocessor at a nominal 
power cost (additional 3-5% overhead when the neural networks 
are powered on [46]-[47]) which is not significant if the network 
is asymmetric. As a future direction, more advanced methods of 
receiver signature compensation will be analyzed along with 
circuit techniques to implement erasability and certifiability, 
leading to practical and efficient implementation of the RF-PUF 
hardware. A formal or experimental validation of the achievable 
protection degree against different attack models will also be 
analyzed as a part of the future work. One other research 
direction involves the stability analysis of RF-PUF in presence 
of temperature and supply voltage variation. 
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